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CASE NOTES
DAMAGES- Measure of Damages for Injury or Destruction to
Growing Crops - By Breach of Contract. - Defendant failed to re-
turn a farm tractor in the agreed time which resulted in a decreased
production of crops by the plaintiff. The alleged loss was three-
fourths the normally produced amount of cotton for the land in con-
troversy. When the contract was formed, there had been notice given
stipulating the necessity for prompt return of the tractor in order to
maintain and cultivate crops, however, the tractor was not returned
for nearly two months. During this interim, the defendant had loaned
the plaintiff a substitute tractor which he warranted as being in excel-
lent condition. The tractor did not produce the necessary work, re-
quiring the use of two mules, which in turn resulted in the loss. The
trial court returned a verdict for $4,000 for plaintiff. Upon trial court
overruling motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, and for new trial defendant appealed. HELD:
Reversed. The admission of evidence by plaintiff and his neighbors
as to what, in their opinions, the crop would have produced and its
quality was too speculative upon which to base estimates of damages.
Amnerson v. F. C. X. Cooperative Service, Inc., 227 S.C. 520, 88 S.E.
2d 605 (1955).
As laid down in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Re-
print 145, 5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 502, 8 R.C.L. 455 (1854), the rule fol-
lowed by the majority of courts for measure of damages to growing
crops by breach of contract is that which arises naturally from the
breach, or in such manner as may reasonably be supposed to have
been in contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was en-
tered into, as a probable result of the breach. Spencer v. Hamilton,
113 N.C. 50, 18 S.E. 167 (1893); Stuart v. Burlington County
Farmers' Exch., 90 N.J.L. 584, 101 Atl. 265, 69 A.L.R. 748 (1917).
Even under the general rule, in order to recover damages, it must
appear with reasonable certainty that the damage would not have oc-
curred had the contract been fulfilled. Lindsay v. Nichols & S.
Threshing Machine Co., 59 N.D. 307, 229 N.W. 808, 69 A.L.R. 744
(1930) ; Fairbanks, M. & Co. v. Austine, 288 Fed. 1 (1923). In order
to recover special damages, it is necessary to allege and prove that
notice was given at the time of making the contract of the special
circumstances from which damages might reasonably be expected to
result. Gadsden v. Fertilizer Co., 89 S.C. 483, 72 S.E. 15 (1911);
Stebbins v. Selig, 257 Fed. 230, 250 U.S. 669, 63 L. Ed. 1199, 40
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Sup. Ct. Rep. 15 (1919) ; Klob v. Southern Ry., 81 S.C. 536, 62 S.E.
872 (1908). Where it is possible, the plaintiff must supply himself
in open market with substitute goods which were contracted for "if
he can do so with reasonable exertion, or at trifling expense, and he
cannot recover from the delinquent party damages which he could
with reasonable effort have avoided." St. Louis Southwestern Ry.
Co. v. Reagan, 79 Ark. 484, 96 S.W. 168, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 997
(1906) ; 8 R.C.L. 442. Where the contractor knows, or should know
by ordinary diligence, that by a delay damage will result which would
be a natural and probable consequence of his delay, generally there
can be a recovery. Neal v. Pender-Hymian Hardware Ca., 122 N.C.
104, 29 S.E. 96, 65 Am. St. Rep. 697 (1898) ; Western Silo Co. v.
Carter, 98 Kan. 279, 158 Pac. 71, 69 A.L.R. 748 (1916); Sutter v.
Intcrnational Harvester Co., 81 Kan. 452, 106 Pac. 29 (1910). The
criterion for obtaining the exact measure of damages is diversified, but
generally the rule followed is to show the kind of crops the land is
capable of producing, the kind of crops destroyed, and the average
yield of the land; U. S. Smelting Co. v. Sisam, 191 Fed. 293, 112
C.C.A. 37, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 976 (1911) ; International Agr. Corp.
v. Abercrombie, 184 Ala. 244, 63 So. 549, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 415
(1913) ; also the average yield per acre of similar land in the immedi-
ate neighborhood cultivated in a like manner. Smith v. Hicks, 14
N.M. 560, 98 Pac. 138, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 938 (1908) ; International
Agr. Corp. v. Abercrombie, 184 Ala. 244, 63 So. 549, 49 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 415 (1913); McCown-Clark Co. v. Muldrow, 116 S.C. 54,
106 S.E. 771 (1921). Such evidence is to ascertain the value of the
crop as it stood at time it was injured or destroyed and not its prob-
able value when mature. Thompson v. Chicago, B. & 0. Ry. Co., 84
Neb. 482, 121 N.W. 447, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) 310 (1909) ; Sayers v.
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 82 Kan. 123, 107 Pac. 641, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.)
168 (1910). However, the rule in South Carolina, and in some other
jurisdictions, is that damages should be measured from the rental
value of land, costs of fertilizers, and other expenses. Horres v.
Berkeley Chemical Co., 57 S.C. 189, 35 S.E. 500, 52 L.R.A. 36
(1900) ; Lampley v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 63 S.C. 462, 41
S.E. 517 (1901). Where it appears that crops have been entirely
destroyed or nearly so, and where there appears to be a reasonable
certainty that crops would have matured, the proper measure would
be to allow for the probable yield when mature and ready for market,
deducting the expense of raising the crop and also the value of the
crop actually raised. Smith v. Hicks, 14 N.M. 560, 98 Pac. 138, 19
A.L.R. 938 (1908); Board of Commissioners v. Richardson, 122
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S.C. 58 at page 60, 114 S.E. 632 (1921) ; Clark Co. v. Muldrow, 116
S.C. 54, 106 S.E. 771 (1921) ; Cushman Motor Works Co. v. Kelley,
70 Okla. 208, 173 Pac. 1042 (1918). Here contingent or speculative
gain, with respect to which no means exist of ascertaining with any
certainty whether they would have resulted or not, are rejected.
Horres v. Berkeley Chemical Co., 57 S.C. 189, 35 S.E. 500, 52
L.R.A. 36 (1900); California Press Mfg. Co. v. Stafford Packing
Co., 192 Cal. 479, 221 Pac. 345, 32 A.L.R. 114 (1907); Fuller v.
Edings, 11 Rich. L. 239 at page 251 (1858).
When the delinquent party to a contract knows, or should know,
that by his delay a serious loss will occur, he should be, and generally
is held accountable for those losses. This general rule has a number
of exceptions, making damages contingent on the injured party's
good faith and reasonable effort to avert the loss by other means.
Where damages are allowed, the principal problem the court must
consider is what evidence should be allowed to ascertain a concrete
figure for the amount of damages, and to what extent speculative or
opinionative testimony may be allowed. The feeling seems to be
fairly unanimous that courts will not allow recovery on a purely specu-
lative basis. Nevertheless, courts have allowed recovery on what ap-
proaches speculation, in that testimony is sometimes allowed where
it is based on a reasonable method of measurement. For example, a
method of measurement might be to compare damaged crops with
those grown under similar circumstances in the immediate neighbor-
hood. Where a definite path is opened by the plaintiff which allows
the court to measure damages, recovery can be obtained. However,
where there is no such course the court in all fairness has no alterna-
tive except to reject the right to special damages.
LEONARm B. BURGESS.
FELONIOUS HOMIC1IDE - The Expanding Concept. - The
present defendant and his co-felon perpetrated a robbery on a grocery
store. While fleeing, the co-felon was killed in an exchange of shots
between himself and the proprietor of the store. The defendant was
indicted for first degree murder. The lower court sustained the de-
fendant's demurrer to the commonwealth's evidence. On appeal,
HELD: Reversed and new trial ordered. The killing of the co-
felon was the natural foreseeable result of the initial act. The robbery
was the proximate cause of the resulting death. Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A. 2d 204 (1955).
1957]
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"He whose act causes in any way, directly or indirectly, the death
of another, kills him within the meaning of the law of felonious homi-
cide. It is a rule of both reason and law that whenever one's will
contributes to impel a physical force, whether anothers, his own, or
a combined force, proceeding from whatever different sources, he is
responsible for the results, the same as if his hand unaided had pro-
duced it." 2 Bishop, New Criminal Law, 636-637 (8th ed. 1892),
cited in Commonwealth v. Alneida, 362 Pa. 596, 12 A.L.R. 2d 183
(1949). By statute, the majority rule today is that every homicide
committed in the perpetration of a robbery is murder. Garcia v.
State, 159 Neb. 571, 68 N.W. 2d 151 (1955) ; People v. Watson, 132
Cal. App. 2d 70, 281 P. 2d 564 (1955) ; State v. Mabry, 324 Mo. 239,
22 S.W. 2d 639 (1929). There are three states which include all fel-
onies. North Dakota Revised Code, § 12-2708 (1943) ; South Dakota
Revised Code § 13-2007 (1939); Oklahoma Statutes, § 21-1701
(1951). There are only three states today which have no statutory
coverage of felonious homicide- Kentucky, South Carolina, and
Maine. Moesel, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 Temple Law Quar-
terly 453 (1955). In those states which have statutes, all who partici-
pate are equally guilty even though the act was done by only one.
People v. Miller, 37 Cal. 2d 801, 236 P. 2d 137 (1951) ; State v. Can-
non, 49 S.C. 550, 27 S.E. 526 (1896) ; State v. Rainey, 149 Me. 92,
99 A. 2d 78 (1953). The test is whether the homicide was committed
in the furtherance of the plan and was a probable result of its execu-
tion. State v. Darling, 215 Mo. 450, 115 S.W. 1002 (1909) ; State v.
Williams, 189 S.C. 19, 199 S.E. 906 (1938). It is immaterial wheth-
er the killing was done intentionally or not, Lynch v. State, 207 Ga.
325, 61 S.E. 2d 495 (1950) ; People v. Coefield, 37 Cal. 2d 865, 236
P. 2d 570 (1951); State v. Ciesiellski, 213 S.C. 513, 50 S.E. 2d 194
(1948), because the distinguishing criterion of murder is malice afore-
thought. Bramlett v. State, 202 Ark. 1165, 156 S.W. 2d 226 (1941) ;
Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868) ; State v. Clmstain, 85 S.C.
64, 67 S.E. 6 (1909). This malice, however, need not be proven be-
cause it is presumed from the doing of a felonious act, Simpson v.
Commonwealth, 293 Ky. 831, 170 S.W. 2d 869 (1943); State v.
Mason, 54 S.C. 240, 32 S.E. 357 (1899) ; State v. Reagin, 64 Mont.
481, 210 Pac. 86 (1922), and the malice of the initial offense attaches
to whatever else the criminal may do therewith. Commonwealth v.
Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A. 2d 98 (1941); Commonwealth v. Lessner,
274 Pa. 108, 118 Atl. 24 (1922) ; Staterv. Heyward, 2 Nott & McCord
312 (S.C. 1820). Deliberation, wilfulness, and premediation are also
implied. Cochran v. State, 48 Ariz. 124, 59 P. 2d 658 (1936) ; Con-
[Vol. 9
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monwealth v. Gricus, 317 Mass. 403, 58 N.E. 2d 241 (1944) ; People
v. Lindley, 26 Cal. 2d 780, 161 P. 2d 227 (1945). The killing of
one felon by another has been held within the doctrine of felonious
homicide, People v. Caballero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P. 2d 364
(1939) ; People v. Udwin, 254 N.Y. 255, 172 N.E. 489 (1930), like-
wise putting a person in a position of danger, death resulting there-
from, to aid the felons in their escape. Keaton v. State, 41 Tex.
Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim.
564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900) ; Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W. 2d
100 (1934). It is immaterial whether the accused is armed, People
v. Jones, 136 Cal. App. 722, 29 P. 2d 902 (1934), nor does the fatal
shot have to be fired by one of the felons. Hornbeck v. State, 77 So.
2d 876 (Fla. 1955) ; Commonwealth v. Moyer, 358 Pa. 181, 57 A. 2d
736 (1947); Wilson v. State, supra. The person killed does not
necessarily have to be the intended victim, nor a defending police
officer. He may be an innocent third party, Commonwealth v. Guida,
supra.; Marion v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 729, 108 S.W. 2d 721
(1937) ; State v. Barton, 5 Wash. 2d 234, 105 P. 2d 63 (1940), or he
may be one of the several felons, killed as a result of his own acts,
Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A. 2d 464 (1953), or
those acts of a police officer. Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra. The
killing does not have to be coincidental with the act, Commonwealth
v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 Atl. 313 (1926) ; Gilmore v. United States,
124 F. 2d 537 (10th Cir. 1942), affirmed, 316 U.S. 661; State v.
Hauptnann, 115 N.J. Law 412, 180 Atl. 809 (1935), but there must
be a causal connection between the killing and the felony, Common-
wealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 4 A. 2d 805 (1939) ; People v. La Bar-
bera, 159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y.S. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1936); People v.
Perry, 14 Cal. 2d 387, 94 P. 2d 559, 124 A.L.R. 1123 (1939), and
the death must be the proximate cause or the natural consequence of
the act. Commonwealth v. Almeida, supra; State v. Glover, 330 Mo.
209, 50 S.W. 1049, 87 A.L.R. 400 (1932); State v. Opher, 28 Del.
93, 188 Atl. 257 (1936).
The proximate cause theory has been applied in numerous criminal
cases. One of the earliest of these is Commonwealth v. Hare, 4 Pa.
L. J. 257, 22 Clark 467 (1844), where an innocent bystander was
killed as a result of a gun battle in a public street. In convicting the
two groups of felonious homicide, it was declared that violators of the
peace whose unlawful act had caused the death of an innocent third
party, or an unoffending person, could not escape punishment merely
because it could not be determined who fired the fatal shot. This
same principle has been applied and upheld, see e. g., Johnson v. State,
5
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142 Ala. 70, 38 So. 182 (1905); People v. Ryan, 263 N.Y. 298,
189 N.E. 225 (1934) ; Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 17 N.E. 898 (1887) ;
State v. Glover, supra. However, some states refuse to apply the
proximate cause theory to criminal cases. Butler v. People, 125 Ill.
641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541,
83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863); Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 87
S.W. 1085 (1905); People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 537, 265 Pac. 230
(1928) ; People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920) ; People
v. La Barbera, 159 Misc. 177, 287 N.Y.S. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924).
It seems that the courts of Pennsylvania have set a precedent in the
principal case above. One of the most closely related cases would
be that of People v. Garippo, supra, in which one of the felons was
killed during the course of a robbery by persons unknown. All the
co-felons were convicted of manslaughter in the lower court on the
proximate cause theory. On appeal, however, the courts refused to
recognize the proximate cause theory and reversed the verdict. In
People v. La Barbera, supra, and People v. Ferlin, supra, the facts
are primarily the same in that one felon hired another to burn a build-
ing and the other felon was killed as a result of his own act. In both
of these cases the defendant was acquitted on the basis of the word-
ing of the penal code along with the reasoning that the deceased could
not be guilty of his own murder, and therefore, neither could the de-
fendant. However, in the Bolish case, supra, in which the facts were
the same, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. In
the case under discussion, the killing, in the manner in which it took
place, was, and has been for many years considered a justifiable homi-
cide in the eyes of the law. It is conceded that the Ferlin case, supra,
and the La Barbera case, supra, could have reached similar decisions
by applying the proximate cause theory. So also could practically any
result be reached in criminal cases by applying the proximate cause
theory and eliminating its major defense, i. e., intervening cause, on
the basis of having a duty to protect the rights of the public equally
with those accused of crime as was apparently done here in the Bolish
case, supra, and the Thomas case, supra.
Speaking in reference to the cases considering felonious homicide
in South Carolina, it seems that the present law would be that while
perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a felony or unlawful act, the
liability of each co-felon extends to any acts done by one or more of
his confederates as a natural and probable consequence of the acts
done in pursuance of their common design. Although this is an ap-
plication of the proximate cause theory to some degree, it seems that
[Vol. 9
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the intervening cause comes into effect when the acts are done by
someone other than one of the felons. It is conceivable that the
courts, in order to achieve justice, would extend this doctrine of
felonious homicide to include liability for the death of innocent per-
sons killed accidently by police officers or individuals while defending
their life or property, but it is difficult to conceive them extending
such liability to the extent that a killing that was heretofore consid-
ered a justifiable homicide, would now be considered murder. Re-
gardless of whether Pennsylvania has extended the common law doc-
trine of felonious homicide, or have read a great deal more into their
present day statute than was intended to be there, it will be interesting
to see how many of her sister states concur in the results reached in
the principal case just discussed.
ROBERT M. KINDRICK.
LIBEL AND SLANDER - The Qualified Privilege of Mercantile
Agencies. - Defendant, a mercantile agency, published a report to
the effect that the plaintiff was heavily in debt both for the purchase
price of his business and the business itself. The report was sent to
two subscribers who had requested credit information concerning
the plaintiff. It was conceded that part of the report was false. On
the same day that the defendant was informed that the report was
erroneous, it notified both subscribers of the error. The report was
recovered unopened from one subscriber. In an action for libel
plaintiff sought to prove the defendant guilty of gross negligence
amounting to malice in employing its representative who supplied the
erroneous information. It was shown that the representative had
been convicted for drunkenness on numerous occasions more than one
year previous to his employment with defendant. There was evi-
dence that plaintiff and the representative had been and still were
good friends. The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of defen-
dant upon the ground that the evidence presented adnitted of no
reasonable inference than that it was a qualifiedly privileged occasion
and there was no evidence of malice. On appeal, HELD: that the
judgment be affirmed. F. R. Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 228
S.C. 384, 90 S.E. 2d 370 (1955).
The general rule appears to be that reports by mercantile agencies
are qualifiedly or conditionally privileged if furnished in good faith
to a subscriber having a legitimate interest in the information. Erber
& Stickler v. R. G. Dun & Co., 4 McCrary 160, 12 F. 526 (C.C.A.
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Ark. 1882) ; Sunderlin v. Bradstreet, 46 N.Y. 188, 7 Am. Rep. 322
(1871); Orinsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868); Bradstreet Co.
v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S.W. 753, 2 L.R.A. 405 and note, 13 Am.
St. Rep. 763 and note (1888). However, in some jurisdictions, a
report of a mercantile agency has been held not to be privileged.
Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172, 4 Am. St. Rep. 77 (1886);
Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 696, 139 Pac. 1007,
51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 893, Ann. Cas. 1916D 761 (1914); Macintosh v.
Dun, 18 A.C. 390, 2 B.R.C. 203, 12 Ann. Cas. 146 (1908). A com-
munication sent to all subscribers without regard to their interest in
the information destroys the privilege. King v. Patterson, 49 N.J.L.
417, 9 A. 705, 60 Am. Rep. 622 (1887) ; Sunderland v. Bradstreet,
supra. A report of a mercantile agency in order to be privileged
must have been furnished to persons having an interest in the subject
matter. Pollasky v. Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5, 9 L.R.A.
102, 21 Am. St. Rep. 516 (1890); Taylor v. Church, 8 N.Y. 452
(1853); R. G. Dunn & Co. v. Shipp, 60 S.W. 2d 502 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933), partly reversed on other grounds 127 Tex. 80, 91 S.W.
2d 330 (1936). The privilege will be lost if the communication con-
taining defamatory statements goes beyond what the occasion re-
quires even though there might be a common interest or duty of the
parties. Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490, 38 S.E. 2d 641
(1946); Bohlinger v. Germanic Life Insurance Co., 100 Ark. 477,
140 S.W. 257, 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 449, Ann. Cas. 1913C 613 (1911).
In order for the communication to be privileged, it must have been
furnished in good faith. Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, supra; Fitchette
v. Sumter Hardware Co., 145 S.C. 53, 142 S.E. 828 (1928) ; Switzer
v. American Railway Erpress Co., 119 S.C. 237, 112 S.E. 110, 26
A.L.R. 819 (1922) ; Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, supra. Ordinarily proof
of a defamatory communication makes out a prima facie case of mal-
ice, but where there is a privileged communication the presumption
of malice is rebutted and the plaintiff must show malice in fact. Bell
v. Bank of Abbeville, supra; Kenny v. Gurley, 208 Ala. 623, 95 So.
34, 26 A.L.R. 813 (1923) ; Southern Ice Co. v. Black, 136 Tenn. 391,
189 S.W. 861, Ann. Cas. 1917E 695 (1916).
Modern business could hardly exist without the extensive use of
credit. With the increasing growth of business and commerce, the
need and worth of mercantile agencies is well recognized. However,
the mere fact that mercantile agencies perform a beneficial service
should not, in itself, cloak them with the privilege of issuing false re-
ports to their subscribers. They enter into business and hold them-
selves out to the public to supply information for profit. It is not un-
[Vol. 9
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just that they should assume the responsibility for their acts. Their
entire motivation is profit and self-interest. Justification of the privi-
lege to mercantile agencies has been based largely on the existence of
a private duty of the mercantile agency to its subscribers who have
an interest in the information. However, the very nature of that
duty is that the information shall be accurate and not an erroneous
or false report. If the privilege were removed from mercantile agen-
cies, it would neither impose an undue burden upon them nor would
it impede their business. Insurance is a preventive technique. Third
party liability insurance is available to minimize risks. Fortunately
in the instant case, the error in the report was discovered upon re-
ceipt by the subscriber. However, it is conceivable that a false report
may be issued by a "credit" agency and acted upon by a subscriber
and cause damage to an individual's business and reputation. If the
communication was made in good faith and not actuated by malice,
the injured party would be without redress. At least negligence
should take the place of malice. It appears that an unjust burden is
imposed upon an individual to require him to show express malice
or malice in fact in order to destroy the qualified privilege of a mer-
cantile agency.
WILLIAM LEIGHTON FILSON.
PROPERTY-Rights of Riparian Landowners on Navigable
Streams to Compensation for Loss of Land as a Water Power Site
in Eminent Domain Proceedings. - Condemnee (a South Carolina
corporation) and a subsidiary Georgia corporation owned 4,519.15
acres of land in fee and had flowage rights over 188.50 additional
acres. In 1944, Congress authorized the Clark Hill project. In 1947,
the United States instituted its condemnation proceedings in South
Carolina. At the same time, condemnation proceedings with regard
to the property owned by the Georgia corporation were instituted in
Georgia. Condemnee filed an answer claiming value based upon the
potential use of their fast lands located above the high water mark
of the river for water power development. Motions of the United
States to strike these allegations were denied. United States v.
1,532.63 Acres of Land, 86 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. S.C. 1949). The
question of just compensation was submitted to commissioners ap-
pointed by both district courts. After a joint proceeding, it was
found that $60,293.60 was the value of the lands, considering only
the agricultural and wild forest value. The commissioners also found
19571
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that the lands in question "were peculiarly adapted for use as a site
or as an integral portion of a site for hydro-electric development,"
that this potential use had affected the market value of the land, and
that the sound market value (including the value as a potential power
site) totalled $1,257,033.00. This amount was allocated on an acre-
age basis. The award for the South Carolina lands was $471,904.45.
The district court affirmed and gave judgment for the amount of the
award. United States v. 3,928.09 Acres of Land, 114 F. Supp. 719
(W.D. S.C. 1953). Aff'd, United States v. Twin City Power Co., 215
F. 2d 592 (4th Cir. 1954). Cert. granted, United States v. Twin
City Power Co., 348 U.S. 910 (1955). HELD, four judges dissent-
ing: Reversed. There can be no vested private claims in the water
of a navigable river that constitute "private property" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment; consequently, the United States
is not required to pay for any special value of the land in relation
to the use of the water of the river. United States v. Twin City
Power Co., 76 S. Ct. 259 (1956).
The exercise by the Federal Government of the power of eminent
domain is subject to the provision of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. The fair market value of the property
at the time of the taking is usually the measure of just compensation.
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950);
United States v. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 (1948). But, uses of
the property available only to the taker are not considered in the
determination of the fair market value. United States v. Miller, 317
U.S. 369 (1943) ; Union Exploration Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Im prove-
mnent Dist., 104 Colo. 109, 89 P. 2d 257 (1939). This being the case,
it must be noted that the interest of the Federal Government in the
flow of a navigable stream is a dominant servitude. United States v.
Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386, 391 (1945) ; Federal Power
Commission v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249
(1954). This interest has been called a superior navigation ease-
ment. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 736
(1950). It must be noted further that the Government, at its dis-
cretion, can exclude riparian owners from the benefits of the power
in a navigable stream. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424 (1940). Therefore, where the United States
elects to exclude riparian owners from the benefits of the power in a
navigable stream by the exercise of its servitude, or easement, no value
contingent upon a utilization of the flow of the river can be attri-
buted to the property.
[Vol. 9
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In the instant case, the Supreme Court relied on United States
v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). On the
strength of a supposed similarity between Chandler-Dunbar and the
instant case, the majority of the Court rendered a decision denying
to condemnee the power-site value of its riparian lands. It would
appear that Chandler-Dunbar is distinguishable from the present case
in one aspect. Another aspect of Chandler-Dunbar tends to support
the conclusion reached by the District Court of South Carolina, as
affirmed by the court of appeals. First, as to the distinction between
Ch'andler-Dunbar and the instant case: In Chandler-Dunbar the
United States exercised its navigation servitude to the exclusion of
all other interests and eliminated without compensation a hydro-
electric development constructed on submerged land within the bed
of the St. Marys River. This property had no value independent of
an appropriation of the flow of the river to a commercial use, whereas
the land involved in the present case is fast land lying above the high
water mark (condemnee with particularity did not claim any com-
pensation for land within the bed of the river). Furthermore, the
land in the present case has at least soine value independent of an
utilization of the flow of the stream. Now, as to the other aspect of
the Chandler-Dunbar case: in fixing compensation for two strips of
fast land, the Supreme Court allowed the inclusion as an element of
value the availability of the parcels of land for lock and canal pur-
poses. In the words of Mr. Justice Burton, who wrote the dissent
in the case under study: "The Chandler case thus supplies specific
authority for the decision of the lower courts in the instant case."
The majority of the Court dismissed from mind this second aspect of
the Chandler-Dunbar case by saying that the Court perhaps has been
influenced in deciding Chandler-Dunbar by the fact that the use to be
made of the land by the Government "was wholly consistent with the
dominant navigation servitude of the United States and indeed aided
navigation." The majority of the Court is faced with a dilemma if it
chooses to justify in this way the holding of the Chandler case as to
the compensation paid for condemned fast lands. On the one hand,
in the instant case, if the dam and its incidents are not for the pur-
pose of aiding navigation, then the contention of the respondent that
this development did not constitute an exercise of the Government's
superior navigation easement seems correct. On the other hand, if
this development was in the interest of navigation, then it must be
said in this case (just as the majority suggested was said in Chandler-
Dunbar) that the use to be made of the land by the Government was
"wholly consistent with the dominant navigation servitude of the
1957]
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United States and indeed aided navigation," for the land was to be
utilized concomitant to the construction, maintenance, and operation
of the dam, which, according to the Government, was built in the
interest of navigation. The brief submitted by the Government stated
at page 28, commenting on the last mentioned feature of the Chandler
case: "the award based on the land's utility for canal purposes was
in no sense predicated upon the notion that the riparian owner or
any private person can have a property interest in the flow of the
stream ... ." Condemnee in the present case did not rely upon any
interest in the flow of the stream - instead condemnee relied upon
the "land's utility" for a power site. If land which was deemed par-
ticularly adaptable to use as a site for a canal (through which the
water of the river must actually flow) does not depend upon an in-
terest in the flow of the stream which would be adverse to the Govern-
ment's dominant servitude, then land which is deemed particularly
adaptable to use as a site for a hydro-electric power plant should be
at least equally independent of the necessity for relying upon an in-
terest in the flow of the stream in order to have compensable special
value. Therefore, it appears that the dissent in this case is more nearly
in line with the earlier decisions.
KIMMIT S. KING.
STATUTES - Liability of Public Officers Under Unconstitutional
Statute. - This was an action against a public officer for killing plain-
tiff's dog under a subsequently declared unconstitutional state statute.
Defendant, a public conservation officer, alleged immunity from lia-
bility as the act was committed before the statute was declared uncon-
stitutional. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On
appeal, HELD: Affirmed. An unconstitutional act is not law and,
subject to certain exceptions, confers no rights and affords no protec-
tion. B. M. Smith v. John S. Costello, 77 Idaho 205, 290 P. 2d 742
(1955).
In an action brought against a public officer it has been stated that
everyone is presumed to know the law, and therefore, if an officer
acts under an unconstitutional enactment of the legislature, he does so
at his peril and must suffer the consequences. Sumner v. Bealer, 50
Ind. 341, 19 Am. Rep. 718 (1875) ; Bonnet v. Vallier et al., 136 Wis.
193, 116 N.W. 885 (1908). However, it has been held that an officer
who has acted in good faith in enforcing an unconstitutional statute
is not liable. Henke v. McCord, 55 Iowa 378, 7 N.W. 623 (1880) ;
State v. Goodwin, 123 N.C. 697, 31 S.E. 222 (1898) ; O'Shields et al.
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v. Caldwell et al., 207 S.C. 194, 35 S.E. 2d 184 (1935). There is also
the presumption that all legislative enactments are constitutional and
are to be regarded as law until declared void by the courts. Birdrell
v. Smith, 158 Mich. 390, 122 N.W. 626 (1909); State v. Goodwin,
123 N.C. 697, 31 S.E. 221 (1898) ; Rexter v. Alfred, 64 Hun. 636,
19 N.Y.S. 770 (1892). Some courts hold that imposing liability on
judicial officers impedes the enforcement of the laws and weakens the
whole structure of government, and that the interest of the public over-
rides the interest of the individual. Tillman v. Beard, 121 Mich. 475,
80 N.W. 248 (1899) ; Brooks v. Mangen, 86 Mich. 576, 49 N.W. 633,
24 Am. St. Rep. 137 (1891). In regard to an unconstitutional statute,
when an officer is acting in a judicial capacity he is not liable for mere
errors of judgment, when exercising improper judicial functions.
Trammell v. Russelville, 34 Ark. 105, 36 Am. Rep. 1 (1879); Good-
win v. Guild, 94 Tenn. 486, 29 S.W. 721 (1895). rurther, it has
been held that a judicial officer will be protected in relation to all acts
done under or pursuant to public law, before it is judicially deter-
mined to be unconstitutional. The State v. Anthony Carroll, 38 Conn.
449 (1871); Archibald Taylor v. Thomas Skrine, 3 Brev. L. 516
(S.C. 1815).
Some courts have held public officers liable by stating that there
is no duty on anyone to obey an unconstitutional statute and no duty
on the officer to enforce it. County Commissioners of Wyandotte
County v. Kansas City Ft. & S. & M. R. Co., 5 Kan. App. 43, 47
Pac. 326 (1896); Campbell v. Bryant, 104 Va. 509, 52 S.E. 638
(1905). By the same reasoning, public officers have been allowed to
recover what they have been denied under an unconstitutional statute.
Ridgill v. Clarendon County, 192 S.C. 321, 6 S.E. 2d 766 (1939) ;
Gamble v. Clarendon County et al., County Board of Commissioners,
188 S.C. 250, 198 S.E. 857 (1937) ; Dean v. Spartanburg County, 59
S.C. 110, 37 S.E. 226 (1900). At the same time, no protection is
afforded them in retaining taxes collected under unconstitutional stat-
utes, Board of Highway Com'rs., Bloomington T. P. v. City of
Bloomington, 253 Ill. 164, 97 N.E. 280 (1911) ; Valentine v. Robin-
son, 188 S.C. 194, 198 S.E. 197 (1938); nor are they protected in
collecting an unconstitutional tax. Cannon v. Montgomery, 184 Ga.
588, 192 S.E. 206 (1937) ; Dennison Mfg. Ca. et at. v. Wright, 156
Ga. 789, 120 S.E. 120 (1923). Some jurisdictions have resorted to
fiction by regarding a public officer as a private wrongdoer who has
acted without the authority of law. Saratoga State Waters Corp. v.
Pratt, 227 N.Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834 (1920); Poindexter v. Green-
how, 114 U.S. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. 903, 29 L. Ed. 185 (1885). While
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others treat unconstitutional enactments as void, in whatever proceed-
ings they may be encountered, an unconstitutional statute, though
having the form and name of law, is in reality no law. State ex rel.
Mclnvaille v. Rouse, 86 S.C. 344, 68 S.E. 629 (1910); Ex Parte
Hollman, 79 S.C. 9, 60 S.E. 19 (1908). Therefore, rights cannot
be built up under it, contracts which depend upon it for their con-
sideration are void, it constitutes a protection to no one who has acted
under it, and no one can be punished for having refused obedience
to it before the decision was made. Norwood v. Goldsmith, Treas-
urer, et al., 168 Ala. 224, 53 So. 84 (1910) ; Chenango Bridge Com-
pany v. Paige, 83 N.Y. 178, 38 Am. Rep. 407 (1869); Atkinson v.
Southern Express Co., 94 S.C. 444, 78 S.E. 516 (1913). The doc-
trine that an unconstitutional statute gives no immunity is expressed
by the interpretation of the statute being void "ab initio" and totally
without effect. It is inoperative as though it had never been passed
and anyone acting under it is liable because he acted without the au-
thority of law. Herrington v. State, 103 Ga. 318, 29 S.E. 931
(1898); Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct. 1121, 30
L. Ed. 178 (W.D. Tenn. 1886).
The courts of this country have expressed their views on the lia-
bility of public officers acting under a subsequently declared uncon-
stitutional statute in no hard and steadfast rule. The majority of the
courts, including South Carolina, agree with the holding that an un-
constitutional statute affords no protection to a public officer, but due
to public policy this rule has been qualified when it is deemed to be
for the common good, particularly, in regard to judicial public officers.
The reasonable conclusion is that the court will not commit itself to
any iron-clad rule, but will work an equitable result as each case arises,
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and which
interpretation would best serve the public interest.
In the instant case, it seems to appear that due to the particular
circumstance of this case, the court reached the conclusion that the
only equitable result would be to refuse immunity to the public of-
ficers by indorsing the view that an unconstitutional act is no bar at
all, and affords no protection to anyone.
DAVID W. HIARWLL.
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